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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEPHEN LEE KIMBLE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45938
COUNTY NO. CR 2017-7184-FE

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stephen Lee Kimble pled guilty to one count of felony
DUI. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with one and a half years fixed. On appeal,
Mr. Kimble contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it
is excessive given any view of the facts. He further contends that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional information submitted in
conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 11, 2017, an officer responded to a report of an intoxicated driver at a Burger
King restaurant. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.) After the officer
observed the car crossing the center lane and hitting the sidewalk, he stopped the car and spoke
to the driver, Mr. Kimble. (PSI, p.4.) The officer smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on
Mr. Kimble’s breath and a blood test yielded a BAC of 0.26. (PSI, pp.4; Tr., p.29, Ls.16-18.)
Mr. Kimble was not particularly cooperative during the blood draw and flexed his arm, causing
the needle to come out of his vein. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Kimble had two prior misdemeanor DUIs in
the last ten years. (R., p.41.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Kimble was charged by Information with felony DUI and
misdemeanor resisting and obstructing.

(R., pp.40-41.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Mr. Kimble pled guilty to felony DUI and the resisting and obstructing charge was dismissed.
(Tr., p.6, L.1 – p.7, L.7; p.14, Ls.13-17; R., pp.64-67, 101.) There was no agreement as to
sentencing recommendations, other than the State would recommend no more than a retained
jurisdiction. (Tr., p.6, Ls.4-7; R., p.65.) The district court accepted the guilty plea and set the
matter for sentencing. (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Kimble’s counsel asked the district court to sentence
Mr. Kimble to probation. (Tr., p.24, Ls.6-10.) The State asked the district court to sentence
Mr. Kimble to a unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, but to retain jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.2-16; p.33, Ls.16-17.) Mr. Kimble was sentenced to ten years, with one and onehalf years fixed. (Tr., p.44, Ls.10-15; R., pp.93-95.)
Mr. Kimble then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence. (R., pp.102-104.) The district court denied Mr. Kimble’s Rule 35 motion after a
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hearing.

(R., pp.113-114, 127-128.)

Mr. Kimble filed a notice of appeal timely from the

judgment of conviction and the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.123126.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with one and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Kimble following his plea of guilty to felony
DUI?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Kimble’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Kimble Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Felony DUI
Mr. Kimble asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years,
with one and one-half years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Kimble does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Kimble must show that in light of the
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governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Kimble’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Kimble is only 49 years old, but he has long struggled with an addiction to alcohol.
(PSI, p.1.) He first used alcohol at age 15. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Kimble copes with stress by using
alcohol. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Kimble realizes that his substance abuse is a major problem area in his
life, and he knows he cannot drink alcohol. (PSI, pp.13, 15.) He would like to stay sober and
sought help in the form of a substance abuse treatment program. (PSI, pp.15.)

Mr. Kimble has

had successful periods of sobriety. (PSI, p.14.) However, just prior to his arrest in this case,
Mr. Kimble was on his way to pawn some items so that he could afford to buy gasoline in order
to get to work. (PSI, p.4.) He was anxious and depressed about his finances and lapsed back to
using alcohol to cope. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Kimble knows he needs substance abuse treatment and he proactively went into the
community and took a considerable amount of programming. (PSI, pp.42-51.) Mr. Kimble
submitted a plethora of letters and certificates detailing his excellent progress while in the
community awaiting sentencing. (PSI, pp.42-51.) He completed 120 days of inpatient treatment
at the Volunteers of America. (R., pp.74, 84.) Prior to his sentencing hearing, Mr. Kimble was a
leader in his own recovery, attending treatment five days a week without absences. (PSI, pp.14,
43.) Mr. Kimble utilized multiple community resources—attending Curran Seeley, Alcoholics
Anonymous and the church.

(PSI, p.43.)

For someone so involved in community-based
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treatment and so active in his recovery, being sentenced to serve a prison term caused him to take
steps backward in treating his addiction.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981).
Mr. Kimble served his country in the military. (PSI, p.12.) In State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89, 90 (1982), the court found the defendant’s honorable discharge from the military to be a
factor in mitigation of sentence. Mr. Kimble was honorably discharged after serving in the
United States Marine Corps for two years. (PSI, p.12.)
Further, Mr. Kimble suffers from anxiety and depression. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Kimble takes
medication to manage his anxiety. (PSI, pp.13-14.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the
trial court must consider a defendant’s mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State,
132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Mr. Kimble does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. He loves his
wife, who does not have a criminal record and is supportive of him. (PSI, pp.11, 15.) He also
has support within the community—persons involved with Mr. Kimble in the substance abuse
programming he was attending wrote letters in support of Mr. Kimble.
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(PSI, pp.42-45.)

Mr. Kimble’s pastor provided a character reference, in which he describes Mr. Kimble as having
“positive momentum.” (PSI, p.41.) Further, Mr. Kimble’s manager at his place of employment
also wrote a letter to the court. (PSI, p.40.) The manager described Mr. Kimble as “efficient,
detail-oriented and extremely competent.” (PSI, p.40.) Mr. Kimble was described as “an asset
to the company.” (PSI, p.40.)
Further, Mr. Kimble expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions. (PSI,
pp.4, 15; Tr., p.14, Ls.13-17; p.34, L.13 – p.38, L.2.) Mr. Kimble apologized to the court and
wanted the court to know that he wished he could turn back the clock. (PSI, p.15.) At his
sentencing hearing, Mr. Kimble told the court:
But, you know, at the same time, I did not want to try and come in here and try
and skate around my responsibilities of owning my behaviors. With – like I said,
with the grace of God I hope that everybody here today can see that I’m doing
absolutely everything in my power to show you that this is what I want for my
life.
And my life – my life reflects recovery now. I go to three hours’ worth of therapy
every day. Two hours in a drug and alcohol treatment center and an hour to AA
every day. And that is my daily routine. And then I go to work.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.7-17.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595;
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Kimble asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, family support, and proactive work to treat his substance
abuse/addiction within the community, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Kimble’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35
Motion
Although Mr. Kimble contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the information
in front of the district court at the time of his February 28, 2018 sentencing hearing (see Part I,
supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even more apparent in light of the new
information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Kimble’s Rule 35 motion. Mr. Kimble asserts
that the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of
discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Kimble submitted information
detailing the length of his substance abuse treatment—nearly seven months—as well as
information that he was engaged in treatment specific to his needs in that it addressed some of
his mental health issues.

(Tr., p.48, Ls.6-11.)

The treatment coordinated counseling and

medication management, thus, it was more of a dual-diagnosis type treatment. (Tr., p.48, Ls.914.) As Mr. Kimble’s counsel noted, “Mr. Kimble put in a great deal of time and effort,
probably more time and effort of his own than any client really that we see or any client that I
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have had in recent memory as far as his own efforts in tapping the community resources.”
(Tr., p.51, L.23 – p.52, L.2.) Mr. Kimble even changed his career path, because his career as a
chef put him in a situation where he was more likely to drink alcohol. (Tr., p.52, Ls.3-6.) In
light of Mr. Kimble’s proactive progress in setting up and completing extensive dual-diagnosis
programming in the community, the district court should have reduced his sentence.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at
the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce
Mr. Kimble’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Kimble respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of September, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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